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Abstract
Various cognitive theories aim to explain human deductive reasoning: (1) mental logic theories claim syntactic language-based proofs
of derivation, (2) the mental model theory proposes cognitive processes of constructing and manipulating spatially organized mental
models, and (3) imagery theories postulate that such abilities are based on visual mental images. To explore the neural substrates of
human deductive reasoning, we examined BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent) contrasts of twelve healthy participants during relational
and conditional reasoning with whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The results indicate that, in the absence of
any correlated visual input, reasoning activated an occipitoparietal–frontal network, including parts of the prefrontal cortex (Brodmann’s
area, BA, 6, 9) and the cingulate gyrus (BA 32), the superior and inferior parietal cortex (BA 7, 40), the precuneus (BA 7), and the visual
association cortex (BA 19). In the discussion, we first focus on the activated occipito-parietal pathway that is well known to be involved
in spatial perception and spatial working memory. Second, we briefly relate the activation in the prefrontal cortical areas and in the
anterior cingulate gyrus to other imaging studies on higher cognitive functions. Finally, we draw some general conclusions and argue that
reasoners envisage and inspect spatially organized mental models to solve deductive inference problems. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction information. Various sorts of evidence are compatible with
this assumption, including the well-known studies of the
Reasoning is a cognitive process that yields conclusions mental rotation and the mental scanning of images [40,60].
from given premises. It occurs whenever human beings However, in the behavioral sciences, the question of
make implicit information explicit. This study is about one how people reason deductively is still open. Cognitive
form of reasoning, deduction. By definition, in deductive psychologists conducted behavioral experiments to investi-
reasoning, the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the gate the cognitive processes underlying different kinds of
conclusion. (In contrast to inductive reasoning, in which deduction, such as conditional reasoning, syllogistic
the truth of the premises does not warrant the truth of the reasoning, relational reasoning, etc. Nevertheless, there is
conclusion.) still controversy on how the experimental findings can be
Many people report that they often think by visualizing integrated into a general theory of human reasoning.
objects and events. They typically experience reasoning as Mental proof theories completely deny that reasoning is
seeing the information from the premises and scanning this based on mental imagery, but rather on the application of
vivid mental image to find new, not explicitly given language-like formal rules of inference [6,55]. In contrast,
the mental model theory postulates that reasoning does not
rely on syntactic operations as in rule-based approaches,
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represent situations spatially, but they can abstract away the one hand, Goel et al. [19,20] investigated deductive
from visual details such as colors, textures, and shapes, (and inductive) reasoning problems in two PET studies and
which are not relevant to the problem. reported activation in temporal and prefrontal regions,
The third approach is the visual mental imagery theory. mainly in the left hemisphere. These results appear to
Proponents of this account describe mental images used in support the sentential theory. On the other hand, there are
reasoning as structurally similar to perceptions. Like visual results that at least indirectly support the spatial and visual
precepts, visual mental images represent colors, shapes, theories of reasoning. Prabhakaran et al. [53] studied
and metrical distance, can be rotated and scanned, have a problems selected from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices
limited resolution [14,40], and sometimes are so similar to Test, which elicit reasoning, and found increased activity
real perceptions that the two can be confused [25]. in right frontal and bilateral parietal regions. Osherson et
Reasoning, from this point of view, is to ‘look’ mentally at al. [48] compared probabilistic and deductive thinking and
a visual mental image to find new information not explicit- found in the latter increased activation in right-hemisphere
ly given in the premises. parietal regions. The visual theory is related to a series of
The notion of spatial mental models and visual mental studies that found activity in the primary visual cortex
images is related to Kosslyn’s model in which mental when participants manipulated objects and scenes in
imagery is composed of two different kinds of processes, working memory [42–44,57].
one visual and one spatial [41]. The latter is concerned The aim of the present fMRI study is to explore the
with what an image looks like from a certain point of neural substrates of human deductive reasoning, and
view; the former depends on where an object is located specifically, its visual and spatial components. We selected
relative to other objects. The role of visual mental images two essential sorts of human deductive reasoning: relation-
and spatial mental models in deductive reasoning has been al and conditional reasoning. In a typical relational reason-
studied extensively, for instance, in Refs. [33,34]. ing problem, at least two relational terms X r Y and Y r Z1 2
All three cognitive approaches have been implemented are given as premises, and the goal is to find a conclusion
in computational models. Hagert [24], for instance, pro- X r Z that follows from the premises. In a conditional3
posed a computational account of relational reasoning that reasoning problem, the first premise consists of an ‘if p,
is based on the application of formal inference rules. then q’ statement and the second premise refers to the truth
Schlieder [58] implemented relational reasoning as the of the antecedent (‘if’ part) or the consequent (‘then’ part).
construction and inspection of spatial mental models [23]. The goal is to find a conclusion that follows from both
A computational approach of visual mental imagery in premises. The two valid inferences are ‘if p, then q, and p
reasoning has been developed by Glasgow and Papadias is true, then q is true’ (modus ponens), and ‘if p, then q,
[21]. Further computational visual imagery approaches can and q is false, then p is false’ (modus tollens).
be found in Glasgow et al. [22]. A comparison of spatial
mental models and visual mental imagery in reasoning is
given in Schlieder and Berendt [59]. 2. Method
In recent years, the debate within cognitive and compu-
tational theories of reasoning regarding sentential mental 2.1. Participants
proofs, spatial mental models, and visual mental images
also started in the cognitive neurosciences. On the neuro- Twelve right-handed male students of Freiburg Uni-
anatomical level, the sentential theory predicts that the versity (mean age523.9, S.D.53.3) participated in the
language processing regions of the brain are involved in experiment. None had any history of neurological or
reasoning, whereas the spatial theory predicts that the psychiatric disorders. They were paid for their participa-
cortical areas involved in spatial working memory, percep- tion and informed consent was obtained in writing. Before
tion, and movement control are evoked by reasoning. The the brain imaging study started, participants attended a
sentential theory, furthermore, predicts a dominance of the 20-min training experiment in which they solved 12
left hemisphere, whereas the spatial theory assumes a right conditional and 12 relational sample reasoning tasks.
hemispheric prevalence [19,20,27]. According to the visual Participants were not instructed in any way to choose a
theory, the primary visual cortex, or at least nearby visual particular reasoning strategy.
regions, should be evoked by reasoning without a specific
assumption concerning hemispheric differences [41]. 2.2. Design and materials
While past studies on the neural basis of human
reasoning were restricted to investigations with brain The materials consisted of relational and conditional
damaged patients [7,9,16,17,51,54], more recent neuroim- reasoning problems. The participants acted as their own
aging techniques, such as positron emission tomography controls and evaluated six valid and six invalid inferences
(PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), of the two types of reasoning, making a total of 24
were used to study reasoning processes in the intact brain. problems. The relational inferences included the following
However, the results of these studies are contradicting. On relations: left of, right of, overlaps from the left, overlaps
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from the right, meets from the left, meets from the right, was synchronized to the image acquisition procedure. This
inside, and outside. These spatial–relational expressions was achieved by means of a pulse generated by the
have been used successfully in earlier experiments [32,39]. tomograph, which controlled the computer. Scanning took
The inferences had the following form: place in the blank period directly after the auditory
presentations of the stimuli (premises and conclusions).
The sequence of conditions was counterbalanced over
The red rectangle is to the left of the green rectangle. participants and the order of problems under each con-
The green rectangle overlaps the blue rectangle from dition was randomized.
the left.
Does it follow: 2.4. fMRI data acquisition
The red rectangle is to the left of the blue rectangle?
Local variations in blood oxygenation level dependent
In the conditional problems, half of the inferences were in (BOLD) response were measured on a 1.5-T Vision
the form of modus ponens and the other half in the form of scanner (Siemens) using susceptibility-based functional
modus tollens. The inferences included expressions such magnetic resonance imaging, applying gradient-recalled
as: hates, loves, bores, offends. Here is an example of an echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences. Twenty-four parallel
inference with a valid conclusion: 4-mm thick planes, positioned slightly oblique to the axial
plane and covering the whole brain were imaged using a
T2*-weighted sequence (TR 10 s, TE 66 ms, FA 908,
If the man is in love, then he likes pizza. matrix 2563256 mm, voxel 23234 mm). Sagittal T1-
The man is in love. weighted magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gra-
Does it follow: dient echo (MP-RAGE) images of the entire brain (160
The man likes pizza? slices) were acquired for anatomical localization of func-
tional responses (TR 40 ms, TE 6 ms, FA 408, matrix
Tasks were presented verbally via pneumatic headphones 2563256 mm, voxel size 13131 mm). Statistical maps
and, except for a tiny fixation cross, there was no further were transformed to the same resolution as the 3-D MR
visual input. Problems were presented with a volume that data set by interpolation.
participants had chosen at the beginning of the experiment.
All sentences of the reasoning problems were audiotaped, 2.5. Data analysis and statistics
grammatically correct, and were of roughly equal length.
The T1-weighted image data were used to determine the
2.3. Procedure anatomical localization of functional responses. Each
individual brain was scaled linearly to match the Talairach
The experiment consisted of two experimental runs, and atlas [65], and Talairach coordinates are reported for the
each run of three blocks: (1) relational reasoning, (2) center of each region of interest (ROI). The data were
conditional reasoning, and (3) fixation of a cross on neutral analyzed and visualized using the BrainTools software
background (baseline condition). Each experimental run [61]. Residual head motion caused some image misalign-
lasted about 12 min. Six relational problems were pre- ment, which was corrected by the 2-D motion correction
sented in each of both relational (1) and conditional (2) program IMREG that is part of the AFNI package [8]. It
blocks. aligns each image in the time series to the average image
Premises and conclusions of both sorts of problems were position. The motion-corrected data were then analyzed
each 5 s long and were interleaved by a 5-s blank period. using a correlation method based on methods established
During the blank period after the conclusion, participants by Bandettini et al. [4] and Friston et al. [15]. The time
had to decide whether or not the conclusion logically course of the BOLD response profile was correlated with
follows the premises by pressing associated buttons on a the on/off cycle of stimulation. To reduce noise, spatial
response box they held in hand. smoothing of the functional signal within each slice was
The fixation cross was projected onto a rear-projection performed by convolution with a 2-D Gaussian function
screen covering the rear end of the scanner bore by an [15] having a standard deviation of 1.7 mm. The time
LCD projector. The participants were instructed to keep course of each voxel was correlated with a smoothed
their eyes open at all times and to fixate the central cross to squarewave convolved with a Gaussian function (time
minimize eye movements. They wore headphones and constant54 s) [15].
were positioned with their heads in a radio-frequency Functional activation images were constructed as pseu-
transmit–receive full headcoil, looking up into a mirror in do-color overlays on the corresponding T1-weighted ana-
which the fixation cross of the projection screen was tomical slices. Only voxels with correlation coefficients
reflected. Head motion was minimized with a vacuum cap, greater than 0.5 (P ,0.001 where P 5probabilityvoxel voxel
which was secured within the head coil. Task presentation of a false positive, per voxel) were visualized. The
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correlation values were then normalized to a Z-score (1) conditional reasoning vs. baseline, (2) relational
statistics. Responses in selected ROIs were statistically reasoning vs. baseline, and (3) conditional vs. relational
analyzed to determine the relative magnitude of activation reasoning.
across different stimulus conditions. Voxel clusters con- Since the tasks were presented verbally, it is not
taining a minimum of 838 contiguous voxels were surprising that during both kinds of reasoning, the largest
selected, and for the contrasts only ROIs were investigated increase of activity was found in the primary auditory
in which more than 50% of the subjects showed significant cortex (BA 41, 42; Z-scores.4). These regions were
differences of activation. Analysis of variance with re- eliminated from the further analysis.
peated measurements was performed on the results of The conditional problems (conditional vs. baseline) and
BOLD responses in all ROIs. The activation level was the relational problems (relational vs. baseline) resulted in
indexed by the standard deviation of the T2* signal. To activity in the prefrontal cortex, where significant activity
weight this activation by the extent to which it is correlated was found bilaterally in the medial frontal gyrus, func-
with the stimulus time course, we multiplied the response tionally corresponding to the supplementary motor area
by the standardized correlation coefficient [61]. Additional (SMA; part of BA 6), the middle frontal gyrus (BA 9), and
statistical analysis (ANOVA for repeated measurements) a portion of the cingulate gyrus (BA 32).
was performed on the ROI data using SPSS. Z-scores of In the temporal cortex, significant activation was ob-
the functional activation were calculated from correlation served bilaterally in the middle temporal gyrus (BA 21,
values, activation amplitudes, and estimated degrees of 22). In the parietal cortex, a significant increase of
freedom, separated for hemispheres and Brodmann’s areas. activation occurred bilaterally in inferior (BA 40) and
Further details of data processing can be found in previous superior regions and the precuneus (both BA 7). Occipital
publications of the group [30]. activation was found in the visual association cortex (BA
19), but not in the primary visual cortex. The mean
activities in the relevant ROIs for the contrasts conditional
3. Results vs. baseline and relational vs. baseline are depicted in Fig.
1a and b, respectively. Fig. 2 illustrates representative axial
3.1. Behavioral data and coronal slices of one subject showing localization of
activated ROIs in prefrontal (BA 9) and parietal areas (BA
Overall, participants’ performance in the behavioral 7) superimposed on an anatomical MRI data set.
experiment was slightly better (86.7% correct) than inside We also directly compared the two sorts of reasoning.
the scanner (81.9% correct). However, since the patterns This comparison (conditional vs. relational) yielded activi-
of results were identical outside and inside the scanner, in ty that was greater for relational than for conditional
the following we report only data from the scanning. The reasoning. Bilateral increased activity was obtained in the
analysis of response latencies shows that participants medial frontal gyrus (BA6), the superior parietal gyrus and
needed the same time for correct responses in the relational the precuneus, the inferior parietal cortex (BA 40), and the
inferences (2.0 s) and the conditional problems (2.1 s) extrastriate cortex (BA 19). The activated ROIs (ana-
(t-test, t51.074; P.0.285) and for modus ponens (2.1 s) tomical localization and Brodmann’s area together with
and modus tollens (2.1 s) problems (t-test; t50.216; P. mean Talairach coordinates, separated for the left and right
0.83). The analysis of correct responses did not yield a hemisphere) and mean Z-scores in the three contrasts are
reliable difference in accuracy for relational (78.8% cor- summarized in Table 1.
rect) and conditional (85.2% correct) reasoning (Wilcoxon
test Z51.8; P.0.67), but the comparison of conditional
problems shows that participants gave significantly more 4. Discussion
correct answers to problems in the form of modus ponens
(93.3% correct) than in the form of modus tollens (79.4% The reported results can be summarized under two
correct) (Wilcoxon test Z51.97; P,0.047). These data headlines. First, we focus on the most striking result of the
are in line with other experiments in which the number of present study, namely that reasoning activated the occipito-
correct responses for the relational problems was in the parietal pathway in the absence of any correlated visual
same range [38,39], and with studies showing that prob- input. Second, we briefly relate the activation in the
lems in the form of modus tollens are harder than those in prefrontal cortical areas and in the anterior cingulate gyrus
the form of modus ponens [13]. to other imaging studies on higher cognitive functions.
Finally, we draw some general conclusions an spatial
3.2. Functional imaging data mental models, visual imagery, and reasoning.
In the following, we report the results for all regions of 4.1. Parietal and occipital activation
interest (ROIs) that revealed a statistically significant
increase of activity in at least one of the three contrasts: The most important result of the present study is that
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Fig. 1. Relative activation level of the analyzed ROIs (Brodmann areas 6, 7, 9, 19, 21, 22, 32, and 40) in the contrasts (a) conditional reasoning vs.
baseline, (b) spatial reasoning vs. baseline, and (c) conditional vs. spatial reasoning. Values are indexed by the standard deviation of the T2* signal
multiplied by the standardized correlation coefficient. The results are pooled for both hemispheres and show the mean values for 12 subjects.
reasoning activated the occipito-parietal pathway in the are achieved by three subsystems: the phonological loop
absence of any correlated visual input. Although this is an (PL) is responsible for verbal information, the visuo-spatial
essential result for reasoning, it is supported by brain sketch pad (VSSP) handles and maintains spatial and/or
imaging studies on working memory and mental imagery. visual information, and the central executive (CE) is
Reasoning is undoubtedly a process in which information described as a supervisor that is responsible for the
must be maintained and manipulated. It is a widely shared coordination of the subsystems and the selection of
assumption that these main functions of working memory appropriate reasoning and storage strategies [1,2]. The PL
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Fig. 2. Representative axial and coronal slices of one subject showing localization of activated ROIs in prefrontal (BA 9) and parietal (BA 7, 40) areas
superimposed on the anatomical MRI data set. Z-score is indexed by the colorbar.
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Table 1
Activated ROIs (anatomical localization and Brodmann’s area together with mean Talairach coordinates of the center, separated for the left and right
hemispheres) and Z-scores for the comparisons conditional reasoning vs. baseline, spatial reasoning vs. baseline, and spatial vs. conditional reasoning
Location Mean Talairach coordinates Mean Z-scores
(Brodmann’s area) x y z relational conditional relational
vs. baseline vs. baseline vs. conditional
Frontal
R medial frontal gyrus (6) 3 (62) 24 (68) 57 (66) 3.81 (60.37) 3.16 (60.56) 2.00 (60.25)
L medial frontal gyrus (6) 24 (62) 21 (612) 54 (66) 3.74 (60.57) 3.09 (60.46) 1.51 (60.29)
R middle frontal gyrus (9) 49 (63) 15 (68) 36 (63) 3.76 (60.41) 3.18 (60.20) 1.24 (60.45)
L middle frontal gyrus (9) 245 (64) 18 (616) 35 (63) 3.87 (60.40) 3.40 (60.20) 1.19 (60.27)
R cingulate gyrus (32) 4 (63) 8 (66) 43 (63) 4.27 (60.41) 3.04 (60.18) 1.63 (60.28)
L cingulate gyrus (32) 26 (62) 12 (612) 41 (66) 4.21 (60.56) 3.07 (60.22) 1.54 (60.27)
Temporal
R middle temporal gyrus (21) 59 (63) 238 (68) 21 (64) 4.55 (60.50) 4.60 (60.48) 20.40 (60.87)
L middle temporal gyrus (21) 260 (65) 235 (610) 2l (62) 4.46 (60.41) 4.37 (60.44) 20.27 (60.60)
R superior temporal gyrus (22) 56 (67) 236 (617) 8 (65) 4.74 (60.24) 4.73 (60.22) 0.20 (60.27)
L superior temporal gyrus (22) 258 (64) 237 (617) 8 (65) 5.09 (60.33) 4.79 (60.27) 0.69 (60.54)
Parietal
R superior parietal gyrus (7) 27 (66) 265 (67) 49 (64) 3.38 (60.51) 2.21 (60.43) 2.33 (60.56)
L superior parietal gyrus (7) 233 (67) 265 (68) 49 (64) 3.55 (60.60) 2.54 (60.45) 2.31 (60.59)
R precuneus (7) 5 (63) 269 (65) 47 (66) 3.33 (60.54) 2.29 (60.42) 2.15 (60.38)
L precuneus (7) 29 (64) 266 (66) 48 (66) 3.47 (60.34) 2.66 (60.42) 2.51 (60.45)
R inferior parietal gyrus (40) 39 (610) 256 (67) 39 (69) 3.93 (60.33) 2.93 (60.57) 1.98 (60.72)
L inferior parietal gyrus (40) 237 (68) 255 (67) 39 (69) 4.03 (60.20) 3.39 (60.61) 1.77 (60.47)
Occipital
R middle occipital gyrus (19) 19 (616) 278 (65) 33 (67) 3.43 (60.41) 2.60 (60.58) 2.00 (60.40)
L middle occipital gyrus (19) 221 (69) 282 (67) 31 (69) 3.41 (60.37) 2.46 (60.60) 1.82 (60.47)
Standard deviations (6) for Talairach coordinates and Z-scores are presented in parentheses.
and the VSSP can be further divided into storage and [19,20]. Some authors argued that rules for reasoning need
maintenance subsystems [1,45]. Besides multiple be- not be literally ‘sentential’ in nature, but rather can be
havioral experiments supporting this theoretical frame- based on more abstract propositions [64]. However, the
work, there are also studies on the cortical correlates of the key assertion of the theory is a repertoire of inference rules
three subsystems, which examine the degree to which they which are derived from general knowledge and refer to
are involved in different cognitive functions [10,12,64]. sentential connectives such as ‘if’ and ‘then’, and quan-
According to these studies, spatial working memory tasks tifiers like ‘all’ and ‘some’. The language-based rules are
evoke regions of the parietal cortex, which are usually used to solve inference problems by introducing and
called the dorsal route or ‘where-pathway’ of vision [68] eliminating sentential connectives [6,55]. However, the
and working memory [63,67]. Multiple PET and fMRI data reported here do not support this sentential account of
studies reported brain activity related to spatial memory reasoning. Instead, the obtained activation in a bilateral
tasks in the parietal cortex, in particular in BA 7 and 40 occipito-parietal network provide evidence that reasoning
(for review, see Ref. [10]). is a cognitive process in which spatially organized mental
One can object that reasoning differs in a number of models are used for reasoning [26,29]. In general, the
important aspects from working memory and therefore mental model theory postulates that reasoners construct
does not rely on the same brain regions. Such a position, spatial mental models, inspect them to find a putative
however, is challenged by behavioral studies that recently conclusion, and then search for counterexamples that
investigated the role of the working memory subsystems in satisfy the premises but refute the putative conclusion. If
different sorts of reasoning. The overall pattern of results such a counterexample is not found, the conclusion is
from these experiments is that the VSSP is involved in valid. In contrast to visual mental images, mental models
almost all kinds of reasoning, whereas only weak evidence are a form of representation that can be spatial but more
for the involvement of the PL was obtained [31,35,36,69]. abstract [28]. Mental models represent information in a
Other imaging studies, however, failed to find activation multi-dimensional array that maintains ordinal and topo-
in the parietal cortex during reasoning and, hence, claim logical properties and avoids distracting details. The spatial
that human reasoning is based on a mental logic consisting representation is processed using primitive functions that
of inference rules represented in a language-like format transform and inspect the spatial array. Moreover, a multi-
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dimensional array is able to depict spatial and topological corresponding to BA 9, reflects that reasoning involves the
relations as well as non-spatial dimensions, such as active manipulation and inspection of information in
kinship. working memory. Petrides [50] argues that BA 9 (together
However, the fact that the activity in parietal regions and with BA 46) is related to executive functions and post-
the visual association cortex (BA 19) was not accompanied ulates that BA 9 is typically involved in cognitive pro-
by primary visual cortex activation also has implications cesses ‘when several pieces of information in working
for the visual imagery theory of reasoning. According to memory need to be monitored and manipulated’ [49, p.
Kosslyn’s theory, visual mental images are quasi-pictures 90]. Moreover, several behavioral studies demonstrated
represented in a specific medium called the visual buffer. that the central executive is involved in almost all kinds of
This subsystem is claimed to correspond to the primary reasoning [31,66,69].
visual cortex. In general, theories of visual mental imagery The activity in the anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 32) is in
in reasoning propose three types of processes in the visual agreement with other studies on reasoning that likewise
buffer: the generation process forms a visual image, the found activation in this area [19,20]. Activity in the
transformation process (for example, rotation, translation, cingulate gyrus can be evoked by different cognitive
reduction in size, etc.) modifies the image or views it from processes, but there is no generally accepted theory about
a certain perspective, and the inspection process retrieves its main functions. Some researchers argue that the anterior
information from this representation [5,41,59]. cingulate gyrus is related to attention and to the initiation
On the one hand, the strictest neuro-anatomical hypo- of actions [52], whereas others assume that the anterior
thesis that reasoning evokes activity in the primary visual cingulate gyrus is responsible for the inhibition of irrele-
cortex [41] is not supported by the present data. On the vant information in working memory (for instance in
other hand, other brain imaging studies indicate that Stroop tasks; [18]).
mental imagery tasks do not necessarily involve early In general, the question of how complex reasoning
visual areas. In a previous fMRI study of our group [37], problems evoke prefrontal cortical regions needs a more
for instance, we obtained behavioral data which were in detailed experimental setting. For the present research
agreement with the imagery literature in cognitive psy- question it was feasible to use the fixation-cross as a
chology, but nevertheless did not find activation in the baseline condition, since we were primarily interested in
primary visual cortex. Instead, activation was found in parietal and occipital activation. However, for a detailed
areas similar to the present study—in the inferior and analysis of activation in brain regions related to executive
superior parietal cortex and the visual association cortex. functions, a baseline condition that is more similar to the
Similar results are reported in Roland and Gulyas [56], experimental conditions is desirable.
Mellet et al. [46,47], and D’Esposito [11]. Another
noteworthy point is that Kosslyn [41] postulates that there
are distinguishable cortical correlates for the processing of 5. Conclusion
coordinate (metric) spatial information (and for visual
image generation) and the processing of categorical spatial The aim of the present study was to investigate the
information (e.g. left vs. right, below vs. above). Given neural correlates of human deductive reasoning. From the
that our tasks did not involve metrical information, other different sorts of deductive reasoning we selected two:
tasks that involve such information may activate other relational and conditional reasoning. As proposed by
brain regions. several authors, we identified the spatial accounts of
reasoning with (right) parietal activity, mental proof
4.2. Prefrontal areas and cingulate gyrus activation theories with activity in (left) temporal regions, and the
visual account with activation of the primary visual cortex.
Not only the occipito-parietal pathway is involved in The present study yielded a surprising result: as a neural
visual and spatial working memory, but also prefrontal correlate of two basic kinds of reasoning, we identified a
cortical areas. Baker et al. [3] have shown that prefrontal bilateral occipitoparietal–frontal network distributed over
areas play a role in imagery and visuo-spatial working parts of the prefrontal cortex and the cingulate gyrus, the
memory. In a study by D’Esposito et al. [10], portions of inferior and superior parietal cortex, the precuneus, and the
the supplementary motor area, corresponding to BA 6, visual association cortex. These results provide evidence
appeared to play a role in the spatial encoding in working that deductive reasoning is based on spatial representations
memory. Smith and Jonides [62] argue that the occipito- and processes, and they appear to corroborate the mental
parietal route is primarily responsible for storage of spatial model theory of reasoning. Sentential accounts, such as the
information, while the maintenance component is primarily theory of mental proof, are not supported by the present
localized in the prefrontal cortex (with a right-hemisphere data. The relation between the reported results and the
prevalence), including some premotor areas and the sup- visual imagery theory of reasoning is not clear. On the one
plementary motor area (SMA). hand, we did not find activation in the primary visual
The activity in portions of the middle frontal gyrus, cortex. On the other hand, increased activation occurred in
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